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Michael P. Zirinsky

BLOOD, POWER, AND HYPOCRISY:
THE MURDER OF ROBERT IMBRIE AND
AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH PAHLAVI IRAN, 1924
I'm never looking for trouble, but if it comes I'll welcome it with open arms.
Robert W. Imbrie, Petrograd, 1918
Imbrie was a personal friend of mine.
Allen W. Dulles, February 12, 1926
A MURDER OF CONSEQUENCE

On Friday, July 18, 1924, Robert W. Imbrie, United States Consul in Tehranand personal friend and special agent of Allen W. Dulles, Chief of the State
Department's Near Eastern Affairs Division-was brutally killed. Imbrie was
beaten to death by a mob led by members of the Muslim clergy and including
many members of the Iranian Army. In the weeks preceding July 18, there had
been several outbreaks of anti-Bahai violence. Imbrie and Melvin SeYq10ur ha<;l
gone that morning to investigate a miraculous watering place in central Tehran
that figured in the anti-Bahai excitement. According to contemporary accounts,
a Bahai had been struck blind after drinking from the source when he refused to
make an offering in the name of the Shici saints; his sight miraculously had been
restored after he had repented and made the donation. I
Imbrie's motive for visiting the shrine (saqqa-khaneh) has never been clear.
Presumably he was investigating in his capacity as consul. However, he took a
camera along to take photographs for the National Geographic Society, and the
camera was cited by the Iranian government as a cause of what subsequently
occurred. Imbrie seems to have expected trouble. He brought Seymour, an
oilfield roughne~k who had been imprisoned by the Consulate for repeatedly
bludgeoning his foreman, with him as a bodyguard. 2
After Imbrie had taken photographs of people at the watering place, Imbrie
and Seymour were identified as Bahais by a: 17-year-old mullah, Sayyid Husain,
who accused them of having poisoned the source. The crowd attacked Imbrie,
who continued to take pictures, and Seymour, who wielded Imbrie's "shillelagh."
(The word was Seymour's; the State Department identified the device as a
blackjack.) Unharmed, the Americans momentarily escaped in their carriage. 3
The mob caught up with them when the carriage was detained by a policeman
outside the main barracks of the Pah1avi regiment of the Cossack Brigade, the
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most important military force in Iran. Prime Minister Reza Khan Pahlavi Was
the Cossack commander. Here the crowd was joined by many soldiers, who
pulled Imbrie to the street and beat him. Seymour was attacked on the Cossack
parade ground. Despite the presence of many police officers-the main Tehran
police headquarters was across the street-both Imbrie and Seymour were very
seriously injured before they were finally rescued by the police. In explanation of
their timidity, police officials later admitted that they were afraid of the Cossacks,
who were the real authority in Tehran, and that they were under orders not to
interfere in anti-Bah'ai disturbances. There were about 2,000 rioters. 4
Imbrie and Seymour were attacked a third time as they lay helpless in a
hospital inside the police headquarters. Seymour survived, perhaps because he
already looked dead. Mrs. Katherine Gillespie Imbrie preferred to believe that
the mob passed him by because his naked body displayed "certain physical
appearances [which] gave evidence that Seymour might be a Mohammedan."s
Imbrie received fatal blows. None of the more than 130 wounds, caused mostly
by stones, sticks, and paving tiles, was alone sufficient to cause death-including
the saber cut that flayed Imbrie's scalp to the bone. His body could not
withstand the shock, however, of what the attending physician described as "the
most brutal assault that I have ever known." Conscious to the end, Imbrie
expired about 3:00 P.M., about four hours after the attack began. 6
This murder was instrumental in Reza Khan's consolidation of power in Iran.
In the view of tke British Military Attache, Colonel W. A. K. Fraser, "The event
gave him ... the excuse for declaring martial law and a censorship of the
Press.... Numerous arrests have been made, chiefly of political opponents of
the Prime Minister.,,7 The American view was even stronger. According to
Major Sherman Miles, a United States Army General Staff officer sent to Tehran
to investigate, the murder was deliberate. Miles concluded that the anti-Bahai
rioting in Tehran was intended by the Iranian government to end in the death of
a foreigner. Reza Khan wanted a foreigner to die "so that he could declare
martial law and check the power of the Mullahs.,,8
IMBRIE'S CAREER

The man who thus died was not an ordinary American diplomat; he was a
spy-adventurer. Imbrie had trained for the law at George Washington and Yale
Universities, but he had been bored by its practice. Mter escaping briefly to a
Congo expedition in 1911, he joined the French Army as an ambulance driver
when the Great War broke out. He served at Verdun and on the Salonika front
before leaving in 1917 to join the American Foreign Service as a special consular
agent in Petrograd. 9
In Russia he was loud and violent in defense of American interests. According
to a New York Times account,10 he had beaten with his walking stick on the desk
of Ouritsky, the Petrograd head of the Cheka (the Soviet secret police). He
became a notorious anti-Bolshevik. He distinguished himself by acquiring for the
State Department a set of documents, subsequently proven to be forgeries, that
purported to demonstrate that the Bolshevik government took orders from
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Berlin. After he was expelled from Soviet territory, he went to Viborg, Finland,
in March 1919 to establish and operate "a reconnaissance service for investigation
in Soviet Russia." He continued until June 1920, leaving after his Finnish cover
was blown. II
In 1920 the Department sent him to Istanbul, to work with General Wrangel's
White Army in the Crimea. Before Imbrie arrived, however, Wrangel had been
defeated and Imbrie was forced to remain in Istanbul, where he found little to
occupy his time. His requests to be sent back to Finland or to Bessarabia to
operate against the Soviets were denied. 12
Instead, he was assigned in February 1922 to be a special consular agent with
the Turkish Nationalist forces in Arratolia. His mission was to establish American
diplomatic and commercial influence, and "he succeeded in gaining the confidence
and good will of the Angora [Ankara] leaders in an unusual measure,"
demonstrating "exceptional capacity for dealing with perplexing and perhaps
dangerous situations in out of the way places." According to Admiral Colby M.
Chester, "Mr. Imbrie did more to secure the success of thIS enterprise [the
Chester Project] than any other official.,,!3 This success was achieved at the cost
of offending grecophiles.
In July 1923 Imbrie was recalled to Washington to answer charges/ 4 most
notably that he had endangered the life of Louise Bryant, widow of John Reed
and wife of William Bullitt, by denouncing her to the Turks as a Bolshevik. 15
After cooling his heels for some time, he was assigned to Tabriz, Iran, to reopen
a consulate and to establish an information network on the Soviet Union.
Temporarily he was assigned to Tehran, to replace Consul Bernard Gotlieb, who
was on home leave. 16 He had barely arrived when he was killed.
The State Department understood that it was gambling when it sent Imbrie to
Iran. "Of course in sending a man of Imbrie's rather impetuous disposition to far
away countries we are taking a certain risk," wrote Allen Dulles, on September
19, 1923. "The only question is as to whether the advantages to be gained would
justify this risk. I am rather inclined to think they would.,,17 The gamble failed;
Imbrie's impetuosity contributed to his death. 18
Naturally, in view of his anti-Soviet background, the question of Communist
complicity in the attack on Imbrie was raised. Despite accounts that the
Bolsheviks had put a $40,000 (gold) price on his head, the State Department
could find no evidence of Bolshevik culpability.19 All the evidence pointed solely
to Iranian responsibility, abetted by Imbrie's bad judgment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REACTION

The official American reaction to Imbrie's murder was very harsh and very
concerned to maintain U.S. prestige. The American government insisted on
speedy prosecution, and it intervened in the process to ensure that individuals it
believed to be guilty were punished. When the United States believed the Iranian
court-martial to be whitewashing the military, the American Charge protested to
the Iranian Foreign Minister, and Major Miles tongue-lashed the Iranian Prime
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Minister. When the United States believed an Iranian informant to be in danger
of reprisal, it intervened in his behalf.20
As a result of these efforts, about 20 guilty verdicts were delivered. Three boys
were condemned to death: Mortaza (age 19), a Cossack Private; cAli Reshti (age
14), a civilian camel driver; and Sayyid Husain (age 17), a mullah who claimed
descent from the Prophet. After delaying action until fall, the Iranian government finally executed Mortaza-for breach of military discipline. The government
then announced the commutation of cAli's and Husain's sentences to life in
prison. U.S. protests, including a calculated display of bad temper by Dulles to
the Iranian charge, succeeded in getting the death sentences reinstated. Both
boys were shot in the presence of American government representatives. U.S.
Charge Wallace Murray refused pleas for mercy.21
In addition to insisting on blood punishment, the United States insisted that
Iran pay blood money. Mrs. Imbrie was given $60,000 in compensation for the
loss of her husband. She was not satisfied and for years tried to get additional
funds. The State Department believed that $60,000 was appropriate, given its
study of precedents, but Congress relented in 1926 and voted her an additional
$25,000. 22
Seymour was given $3,000 in compensation for his injuries, an amount that
barely covered his lost wages and transporation costs home. The State Department refused to discuss any liability for his having been endangered by Consul
Imbrie while in custody.23
The U.S. Government received $110,000 in payment for some of its expenses
in the transport of Imbrie's body to Washington by the U.S.S. Trenton, the
newest ship in the American fleet. Charge Murray suggested that this moneyoe
used to establish a scholarship fund for Iranian students in the United States,
after the model of the Boxer Rebellion indemnity. The State Department
announced that this would be done, but the fund was never established. 24
The United States also insisted that Imbrie's body be treated with full military
honors en route out of the country. American authorities accompanied the body
to ensure that Iranian Army and civil officials paid proper respects to Imbrie's
.
25
remams.
At the time this occ).lrred, U.S. officials privately expressed the opinion that
Iran was lucky that it had been the American consul who had been killed and
not the British· consul. British reaction, Americans assumed, would have been
much harsher. They seemed to be proved wrong, however, when on October 27,
1924, a British subject named Cox, an "ex-NCO of the Somersets and of the
South Persia Rifles, who settled down in Shiraz after his demobilization as a
garage proprietor," was killed on the Shiraz-Bushire road by Iranian Gendarmes
under circumstances suggesting murder. Britain, concerned with larger questions
of security in the oil fields, raised no protest 26
RECENT IRANIAN HISTORY

Although this episode has mostly faded from Iranian and American conciousness, it appears to have been of importance both in Iranian history and in
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the history of American relations with Iran. Imbrie was caught in civil violence
whose origins were very old.
Since the Safavid dynasty had transformed Iran into a Shici state in the
sixteenth century, Iranian public consciousness had largely identified Iran with
Shici Islam.27 Some Shici theologians saw secular authority as a usurpation from
the legitimate authority of the hidden Imam. In Qajar times (since the early
nineteenth century) the ulama had gradually put themselves forward as the
protectors of the people against the tyranny of the shahs and of other secular
authorities. This clerical-civil rivalry, along with hostility toward foreign influence, had been a major component in the development of the Iranian revolutionary movement, notably in the Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 and in the
Constitutional period of 1905-1911. The clergy expressed hostility toward foreign influence, which seemed to dominate the shahs, and they succeeded in
mobilizing mass support behind national ideas. The British tobacco monopoly
was quashed by Nasir aI-Din Shah and a Constitution was accepted by Muzaffar
aI-Din Shah largely due to clerically supported mass urban demonstrations,
against which the government was powerless. 28
The reality of increasing foreign control could not be countered by Iranian
clerical action, and during the First World War, Iran was a battlefield for
Turkish, Russian, British, and German forces. After the war only the British
remained, and in 1919 London attempted to impose a protectorate. Iranian
public opinion was extremely hostile, however, and the Iranian parliament
(Majlis) refused to ratify the treaty.29
,"

EARLY IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Other than the Protestant missionaries who had established schools and
hospitals a half-century before the United States actually established diplomatic
relations with Iran, there was little American interest in Iran before World War
II.30 Iran, however, was interested in relations with America. Since the early
nineteenth century, Iranian foreign policy had been dominated by the reality of
the imperialist threats from Russia and from Britain, and since the Napoleonic
wars Iran had sought to balance the power of these two imperialist rivals by
drawing a third great power into the struggle. France, Germany, and the United
States have been such third powers.3!
During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) there were two
private American involvements of consequence. Howard Baskerville, a young
Princeton graduate and a teacher in the Presbyterian mission school in Tabriz,
martyred himself for the Iranian Constitutional cause, dying in the defense of
besieged Tabriz. 32
On a more substantive level, the Majlis in 1911 hired Morgan Shuster to be
Controller General of the Iranian Treasury. Although Shuster was engaged as a
private citizen, he had been recommended by the State Department and his
mission was therefore regarded as quasi-official by the Iranian revolutionaries.
Within a few months Shuster's success at collecting taxes and regularizing the
distribution of revenue had .(1) alienated large numbers of wealthy Iranians,
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(2) given the Majlis hope that it would be able to organize the country
financially, and (3) angered the Russians by using an anti-Russian British officer
as head of the Treasury Gendarmerie to collect taxes in all of Iran, including the
large sphere given to Russia in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. Supported
by their British allies, the Russians demanded Shuster's resignation. He was
.
forced out of Iran at the end of 1911. 33
After World War I, the United States again allowed itself to be drawn into
Iranian affairs. In 1919, the State Department protested against British efforts to
impose a protectorate. 34 Perhaps because this was virtually Iran's only foreign
diplomatic support, the Tehran government again turned to America. After
Tehran refused the British financial advisors proposed in the abortive 1919
treaty, the Iranian Minister in Washington, Husain Ala, suggested a renewal of
the Shuster mission. Shuster himself refused reappointment, but on his advice in
1922 Iran hired Arthur C. Millspaugh, the State Department's petroleum
advisor. 35 Millspaugh was officially regarded by the State Department to be, a
private citizen, but Iran viewed his mission as quasi-official.
THE EMERGENCE OF REZA KHAN

In 1921 a coup had brought the pro-British Zia aI-Din Tabatabai in as Prime
Minister. The military force behind the coup was led by Cossack Colonel Reza
Khan from British-occupied Qazvin. Many contemporary observers assumed
that Britain, having failed to impose a protectorate, had found another way to
dominate the Iranian government, in order to protect Britain's imperial intere'sts
36
. '
in the south.
Although Britain publicly maintained that the coup was not a British affair,37
it seems to have been. 38 Reza Khan had been personally selected by General
Edmund Ironside, commander of British forces in Iran, to command the
Cossack Brigade after its Russian officers had been removed by the British.
Ironside encouraged Reza to seize control in Tehran, and the details of the affair
were planned in coordination with Lieutenant Colonel H. Smyth, the British
officer in charge of "the affairs ofthe Cossack Brigade, ,,39 and Walter Alexander
Smart, the Oriental Secretary of the British Legation. The British Minister,
Herman Cameron Norman, claimed to have had no advance knowledge of the
coup. However, Norman had encouraged Smyth to send Reza with a troop of
Cossacks to Tehran to replace the 600 unruly Cossacks already there. 40 After the
coup, Norman urged his government to support the new regime, which he
characterized as being "hailed with utmost satisfaction .. _as the most favourable
to British interests which could possibly have arisen. ,,41 In his diary Ironside
observed, "I fancy that everybody thinks' that I engineered the coup d'etat. I
suppose I did, strictly speaking. ,,42
There is no conclusive proof of higher British involvement, but the events have
always encouraged Iranian belief that the British government was responsible for
the coup. In this regard it is curious indeed that, within a short time and
apparently on the explicit instructions of Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, three
of the highest-ranking British officials in Iran-Norman, Councellor of Legation
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Reginald Bridgeman, and Military Attache General W. E. R. Dickson-were all
forced to retire. All three men had questioned Curzon's conduct of policy in
Iran. Dickson in particular had publicly made known his disapproval of British
involvement in the coup. All three men were quickly removed from the scene. 43
The continuing policy debate over Iran at the Foreign Office and in the Tehran
Legation strongly suggests, however, that the British goverillnent had no clear
policy toward Iran in 1921. Not until Reza had disposed of all significant rivals
to power in late 1924 did the Foreign Office decide to deal with him
.
11y. 44
uneqUlvoca
After the coup, Reza Khan rose to dominate Iran. He became successively
Commander of the Armed Forces (Sardar Sepah), Minister of War, Prime
Minister (in 1923), and Shah (in 1925). He eliminated rivals from positions of
power; Zia and many other early associates were forced into exile, or worse. He
suppressed rival military forces: The Gendarmerie was merged with the Cossacks
into a ~ew Army, rival nationalist leaders were subdued, and the independence
of the tribes was crushed. Reza's dependence on British money was lessened by
the engagement of an American financial mission under Arthur C. Millspaugh,
which collected taxes, restructured the revenue system, and ensured the regular
payment of government personnel. 45
THE MILLSPAUGH MISSION

During the early years of the Millspaugh ffilSSlOn (1922-1927), the United
States became deeply involved in Iranian affairs. Millspaugh was arrogant,_
tactless, and pro-Pahlavi. As a critical Briton observed, "Dr. Millspaugh is,
perhaps, no diplomat, nor does his report indicate any latent talent for literature.
'The Americans have no political purposes whatsoever,' he says, yet he comes
out openly in favor of Sardar Sepah as the only possible ruler of the country.,,46
The American financial advisors nevertheless did regularize the collection of
Iranian government revenue, and they did succeed in controlling government
expenditure. This was achieved at great cost to Iran, however. In the words of
British Charge Harold Nicolson, "The American Mission, while enriching the
Persian Government, have impoverished Persia. The taxation levied is uneconomic; the purchasing power of the country has generally declined. ,,47 The
success of Millspaugh's advice to the Iranian Treasury was essential to Reza
Khan's consolidation of power, and the U.S. thus helped to lay the foundations
of the Pahlavi Monarchy.48
A FAILED REPUBLIC

In his rise to power Reza made one major misstep. In March 1924, attempting
to follow the model of Turkey, Reza tried to depose the Qajar dynasty and to
create a republic with himself as president. He assumed that, because he had
carefully supervised the Majlis elections, the Parliament would vote enabling
legislation. Instead, he faced a determined clerical-led opposition: Sayyid Hasan
Modarres, who had been imprisoned by Reza at the time of the 1921 coup, led
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the resistance in the Majlis, and many mullahs in Tehran led mass demonstra_
tions against the republic. Reza capitulated. He withdrew the legislation from the
Majlis, went to Qom to confer with the religious leaders, and announced his
agreement that a republic was contrary to Islam. 49
In the next several months there were many suggestions that Reza had lost his
grip and that he would soon be forced from office. The f-ollowing events stand
out:
I. The American-run Treasury took steps to restrict the amount of government
revenue Reza Khan could spend on the army. Millspaugh had actually delivered an
ultimatum on July 17, 1924. This potentially threatened Reza's monopoly of force within
the government. 50
2. Sheikh Khazal of Khuzistan, a notorious British protege and the chief military force
in the oilcproducing province, began to talk of independence. Not only would the
independence of "Arabistan" have been a blow to Iranian integrity, it would also have cut
off oil revenues just as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was beginning to pay
royalties. 51
3. Attempts faltered to break the British oil monopoly and to gain a massive American
loan. A contract with Standard Oil for a concession in the north of Iran was destroyed by
APOC insistence on a 50% share of Standard operations in Iran as the price for transit
rights across the territory of the British concession (the entire southern two-thirds of the
country). A contract with Sinclair Oil Company for a northern concession, which might
have marketed Iranian oil through Soviet territory, was stalled in the Majlis. The election
of Modarres as chairman of the Majlis Oil Commission suggested that Reza's opponents
were in a position to deny him independent sources of revenue. 52
4. Mass demonstrations led by clergy denouncing the tyranny of the government ,were
permitted in the streets of Tehran, unhindered by the army or the police. "Opinion in
diplomatic circles here and among residents of experience is practically unanimous that
Sardar Sepah's influence is waning," the British Legation reported on July 1, 1924. After
Mir Zadeh Eshqi, an anti-Pahlavi poet and journalist, was murdered, 30,000 mourners (at
a time when Tehran had only about 150,000 inhabitants) heard the Prime Minister
denounced as "a murderer and assassin and the oppressor of the people. ,,53 The impotence
of the government was noted in the press, and army officers chafed at Reza's weakness. 54

In an attempt to divert popular opinion from its weakness, the government
seems to have encouraged anti-Bahai violence. The Bahai faith, which began in
Iran in the mid-nineteenth century, frequently had been the object of popular
and governmental attack. Muslims believe the faith to be a heretical break-off
from Islam, and consequently Bahais are not accorded the toleration allowed
Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians. The Bahai faith has also converted many
Muslims, which helps to account for the violence of clerical anti:-Bahai rhetoric;
in Islam apostasy is forbidden and is punishable by death. Bahais also have been
associated in the Iranian mind with foreign influence, in part because the Bahais
were among the first to adopt Western styles of dress. The faith explicitly
encourages scientific innovation. After the Bahai faith spread in the West,
especially in America, there were many contacts between Western Bahais and
their Iranian coreligionists. Bahais have been very prominent among the Iranian
associates of foreigners, including Americans. For all these reasons Iranian
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xenophobia has more than once taken the form of anti-Bahai rioting. Such
violence was rampant in Tehran in the weeks before Imbrie was killed. 55
Indeed, Imbrie himself observed and intervened in the rioting. He believed
that the government was encouraging the anti-Bahai disturbances as a means of
diverting public attention from its failures. In Imbrie's own words, "At every
teahouse a Mullah harranged [sic] the crowd. Mobs, fired by oratory and
hashish, swarmed through the streets, unhindered by the Police, crying against
the Bahaists. ,,56 When two American Bahai medical missionaries (Susan 1.
Moody, M.D., and Elizabeth H. Steward, R.N.) drew the attention of the
crowds in mid-July, Imbrie requested police protection for them, which was
quickly provided. 57 There is no suggestion in the diplomatic record that in so
doing he called fatal attention to himself, although a Bahai account now asserts
that "any American in Iran was automatically assumed by the populace to be a
Bahai. ,,58 Imbrie's curiosity thus having been piqued, his presence at the saqqakhaneh on the 18th does seem understandable, if reckless. 59
CONSOLIDATION OF PAHLAVI POWER

Reza Khan used Imbrie's death as a pretext to take action that helped him to
consolidate his power in Tehran. He immediately declared martial law and
arrested his political opponents. Several opposition editors, who had escaped
this dragnet because they had previously taken refuge (bast) in the Majlis to
protest against alleged government complicity in the murder of Eshqi, openly
accused Reza of using Imbrie's murder to cover illegal action. They suggested
that Reza had plotted for violence against a foreigner so that foreign powers'
would applaud his subsequent steps to strengthen contro1. 60 Circumstantial
evidence suggests that their accusation may have been well founded, for immediately following Imbrie's murder the Iranian government muzzled the opposition press, stopped street demonstrations, strengthened discipline in the army,
and curbed the clergy. Westerners applauded Reza Khan's restoration of order,
explicitly rejecting any Islamic alternative to military justice. 61
Reza also took advantage of Imbrie's murder to bend Millspaugh and the
American Treasury officials to his will. As the Imbrie dispute developed,
Washington warned Millspaugh that "for the United States and for the Legation
it is of paramount importance that adjustment regarding murder of Vice Consul
Imbrie should be reached without delay. It is not the wish of the Department
that the raising of any other question should become an obstacle to that
adjustment.,,62 The United States thus implicitly encouraged Reza's dictatorship
as a price that had to be paid for a satisfactory settlement of the Imbrie
dispute. 63 Following the intervention of the State Department, the American-run
Iranian Treasury met Reza's minimum demands. 64
The northern oil concession stalemate was not broken, however. According to
official American sources, the Imbrie murder caused the termination of the
Sinclair contract. 65 That may be, but it is also true that the Teapot Dome
scandal made it difficult for Sinclair to raise the Iranian loan that was a
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condition of the contract, and that the Soviet government was no longer SUre
that it wanted an American company extracting oil from Iranian territory
adjacent to its borders. 66 Furthermore, Iranian resistance to Sinclair's overtures
also stiffened, as Reza's "recently increased autocratic methods" raised skepticism in the Majlis "as to whether any advantages would re~lly accrue to the
country were a loan to be negotiated.,,67 In any case, the U~S. government
appeared more interested in asserting its prestige during the Imbrie dispute than
in pursuing any specific interests.
With the ending of the Iran-U.S. dispute by the execution of CAli and Husain
on November 2, 1924, Reza was free to leave the capital city. He had support
from the foreign legations, he had secured financing for the army, he had
reestablished discipline in tll<: Cossack Brigade, and by executing Sayyid Husaina mullah-he had demonstrated his domination over the clergy. He left Tehran
in early November in order to subdue Sheikh Khazal of Khuzistan. By destroying Khazal's autonomy, in the course of the next months' campaign, he completed the unification of Iran and ensured that his government would get all the
APOC royalties. 68
From his triumph in the south, Reza went on pilgrimage to the Shici shrines at
Najaf and Karbala in adjacent Iraq. One of the strengths of the Shici ulama in
their rivalry with the Iranian Shahs had always been that, because their leaders
resided in Iraq, they were beyond the temporal control of the Iranian government. By making this pilgrimage, Reza emphasized that he had achieved
complete control in Iran. By receiving him, the mujtahids and the British
recognized his authority. Reza Khan consequently returned to Tehran)n triumph: His control over Iran was complete, and the Peacock Throne was
practically his for the taking. 69
While the Imbrie affair was not the only critical event in Reza's seizure of total
power in Iran, it came at a critical moment in his rise. Reza may well have set in
motion some of the forces that led to the fatal events of July 18, 1924; certainly
he used the murder to his best advantage.
IMBRIE AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN

During the years immediately preceding Imbrie's murder there was an expansion of American participation in Iranian affairs. The two abortive American oil
concessions in the north of Iran were an important feature of this development.
As the voluminous files on this matter in the American diplomatic archives
suggest, had either of these proposals come into effect, there might have been a
vast increase in American involvement in Iran, comparable, perhaps, to what
occurred after the Second World War. There would have been, in any case, an
immediate infusion of American money into Iranian government coffers. It is
clear that Millspaugh and the U.S. government favored this development, a
possibility postponed by Imbrie's death.70
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Imbrie's assignment to Iran was a key
part of this proposed expansion of America.n involvement. Assistance to com-
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mercial enterprises is a normal consular duty, of course, and Imbrie had assisted
in the negotiation of the Chester concession in Turkey. Further, the Sinclair
proposal was based on cooperation with the Soviet Union, and Imbrie was a
Soviet expert. In addition, Imbrie was on close terms with the Sinclair representative in Tehran, Ralph H. Soper (who some, including Mrs. Imbrie, believed to
have been the intended victim of the mob). Finally, the termination of the
concession project because of Imbrie's death suggests that his assignment to Iran
had been important to the project: no Imbrie, no concession. 71 After 1924,
American involvement was sharply reduced, with "American interests in
Persia ... center[ed] largely around the activities of the Presbyterian Board of
Foreign Missions." 72
Imbrie's assignment to Iran also had marked the emergence of an American
policy toward Iran that was concerned more with the Soviet Union than with
Iran. Clearly Imbrie was a man obsessed by the Bolshevik threat, and the
Department of State had sent him to an area bordering the Soviet Union in
order to collect information about the Soviets. American policy in Iran, including both the Millspaugh mission and the oil projects, favored the emergence of
Reza Khan-in the hope that he would be able to stiffen Iranian resistance to
Communist expansion. Secondarily the United States hoped that Reza would be
able to safeguard the interests of the United States in Iran and encourage the
development of a modern, Western-style economy and society.73 Motives were
mixed, but American observations of Iran were skewed by a world view that
increasingly saw events in the context of a great struggle with the Red menace.
Imbrie's death temporarily reduced American involvement in Iran, but it did not
change a view of the world that was to prevail when the United States next
became enmeshed in Iranian affairs.
.
CONCLUSIONS

Despite the nominal harshness of the American response to the Imbrie killing,
the United States continued to support Reza Khan's consolidation of power. The
United States wanted Iran to recognize its strength and majesty, which had been
affronted by the murder of its consul. Only Reza seemed to be in a position to do
this. The United States was extraordinarily restrained in its public acceptance of
the official Iranian explanations of what had occurred. 74 Notwithstanding an
outward show of insistence that justice be done, the State Department in fact
seemed most concerned to maintain American prestige (indeed, "justice" seems
almost to have been a code word for "prestige" in State Department usage).
The Department demanded that Millspaugh give way in his dispute with Reza
over the amount of money available to the army,75 knowing that this would
enable Reza to augment his power. "Whatever justice we obtain must come from
him through his military courts," the Legation reasoned. 76 U.S. Charge Murray
was quite clear, after meeting with Modarres, that Reza Khan was the only
alternative to fanaticism led by a "senile old man.,,77 Suspecting that Reza
personally was responsible for the violence that had led to Imbrie's death~ as

286

Michael P. Zirinsky

Major Miles had reported after his investigation, the United States nevertheless
approved Reza Khan's "desire to create a disciplined armed force in this country
and not to be the commander of a horde of tribesmen. ,,78 Consequently, the
United States acted as if Reza's regime was the best hope for American interests
and prestige in Iran and effectively closed its consciousness to any possible
Pahlavi complicity in the murder of a representative of· the United States
government.
The Imbrie affair also accelerated a 1924 United States policy shift in Iran
from rivalry with Great Britain toward cooperation. After the war, the United
States had opposed much of British policy in Iran, especially the proposed
protectorate and the exclusive control of Iranian oil. In return, the British
opposed the American oil initiatives. There had been a real Anglo-American
rivalry in Iran: The British Legation in Tehran believed that Murray "hardly
takes the trouble to conceal his anglophobia.,,79 On reflection, British Minister
Sir Percy Loraine considered the entire U.S. Legation to be "very nervous of
being thought pro-British." Loraine feared that independent American involvement in Iran might give Iran '~another fatal chance of playing off one Great
Power against another, perhaps even of embroiling them .... Anglo-American
cooperation might save Persia from herself and from Russia," he continued, but
"Anglo-American rivalry destroys [the] last hope of salvation. ,,80
After the murder of Imbrie, however, American policy in Iran moved closely
into alignment with that of Great Britain. American unwillingness to accept
Modarres as a legitimate leader of Iranian opinion, for example, echoed the
British judgment: "The Mujtahid Mudarres," wrote British Charge ~smond
Ovey, is "a bigoted and unwashed Sayyid, the Diogenes of the Majlis, who lives
in a hovel and ostentatiously refuses money for himself. ,,81 As British Assistant
Undersecretary William G. Tyrrell put it on November 12, 1924, "America is
being educated in Eastern matters-which is to the good-especially as regards
ourselves.,,82 In Iran after 1924, U.S. policy usually deferred to a British lead.
One of the worst-founded conclusions drawn by the United States from the
Imbrie affair was the confirmation it perceived for its prejudices about Iran (and
other parts of "the Orient"). Iranians were expected to lie. According to Elgin
Groseclose, "approbation of deceit permeates Persian literature." 83 James
Morier's Hajji Baba,84 which glorified roguish behavior, was a major source for
Americans in Iran-it may have been Imbrie's most significant training for his
last post. Murray believed that "the Persian is venal. His promises and lip service
can be bought for a song. ,,85 Dulles expressed the belief, in a memorandum for
Secretary of State Hughes and Undersecretary Grew on October 18, 1924, that
"Morteza's execution was intended more to be a sop to this government than a
real effort to execute a guilty person," and therefore he pressed for more
executions. 86 It did not matter that CAli and Husain were young, according to an
unsigned NEA memorandum, because "human life as such is not greatly valued
by orientals.,,87
This widely believed cliche is a species of self-fulfilling prophecy. By categorizing the residents of Iran as "orientals" who do not value "human life as such,"
the men of the State Department were asserting that Iranians were lesser
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creatures, fit to be manipulated and brutalized. 88 Such an ethnocentric basis for
observing Iran may have seriously skewed American perceptions of reality and
provided an unrealistic basis for American foreign policy.
The Imbrie affair also may have seriously skewed Iran's perception of the
United States. The American response to Imbrie's murder was intended to make
Iran see that the United States of America was powerful and majestic, that the
United States insisted on justice, and that justice had to be swift and harsh. As
Allen Dulles put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 12,
1926, "When you are dealing with a government like Persia ... if you ask them
to execute a Moslem for the death of a Christian ... if they do it, you
accomplish more for the prestige of your country than if they paid a million. ,,89
What Iran perceived may have been quite different. Despite strong evidence of
high-level military involvement in the riot that led to Imbrie's death, the United
States did not insist on punishment of high-ranking officers, nor did it distance
itself from a prime minister who also had been implicated. Some enlisted men
were punished harshly, but incompetent and culpable officers were hardly
reprimanded. Some were even promoted. The United States had reason to be
critical of Reza, but it chose to see in him the only possible source of "justice."
Similarly, the only civilians punished were very young. Of course the United
States took care to ensure that both of the condemned boys had passed puberty
and that there was no serious reason in Muslim law why they should not be
killed. 90 Still, the United States insisted on the shooting of two boys, aged 14 and
17, on the action of a court-martial conducted by officers who had failed to
prevent the murder of Imbrie by men under their command. The executions of .
CAli and Husain were just as much sops to U.S. opinion as had been that of' •
Mortaza. Under these circumstances, Iran reasonably could conclude that the
United States, although a great power, could be manipulated, and that, despite
sanctimonious talk about justice, the United States winked at abuse of power.
Iranian-American relations were relatively quiescent after 1924, until the
Second World War again brought the U.S. into Iranian affairs. When the United
States and Iran then became vitally concerned with each other, their mutual
understandings and misunderstandings-based in part on the Imbrie affairwould form the basis for their subsequent relations. The Imbrie episode alone
did not set the pattern for future American relations with Iran, but it sharply
illustrates patterns that already existed, patterns that were reinforced in 1924,
and that were to be very important after 1941. In its view of Iran, America
supported Pahlavi militarism; it refused to see the ShiCj clergy as legitimate
leaders of Iranian national opinion, it was preoccupied by concern with Soviet
intentions, and it was increasingly willing to defer to British views and experience. In retrospect, these patterns do not seem to have provided a sound
foundation for a healthy American relationship with Iran.
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